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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________________ 
 
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 This appeal represents the latest chapter in plaintiffs' ongoing effort to 
obtain injunctive relief under the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act ("PMPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 
2801 et seq.  Specifically, plaintiffs, operators of a service station, have sought a 
preliminary injunction to prevent defendants from refusing to renew plaintiffs' franchise 
and from evicting them from the franchise location, which plaintiffs have occupied since 
1978.  Plaintiffs' initial request for injunctive relief was denied on the ground that
event required to trigger the enforcement provisions of the PMPA, termination or 
nonrenewal of a franchise, had not yet occurred.  Now that the required nonrenewal has 
clearly occurred, the question presented by this appeal is whether injunctive relie
still an available remedy for these plaintiffs against these defendants.   
I. 
 Defendant Sun Company, Inc., ("Sun") is a refiner and marketer of motor fuels.  
In 1978, plaintiffs Prakash and Shobha Patel, husband and wife, entered into a lease and 
franchise relationship with Sun for the operation of a Sunoco service station.  At the 
time of this original agreement, Sun owned the real estate on which the service station 
was located.  This parcel also contained an office building with a parking lot.     
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 In December 1987, Sun sold the entire parcel of land to defendant Lancaster 
Associates ("Lancaster").0  Lancaster leased the service station back to Sun through 
September 30, 1994, and granted Sun the right to sublease it.  Sun then offered to 
sublease the service station to the Patels for a period of three years.  The sublease 
agreement specifically stated that Sun's right to grant possession of the premises would 
be subject to an underlying lease which would expire on September 30, 1994.  The sublease 
agreement also clearly stated that the underlying lease "might expire or nonrenew at the 
expiration of the initial term or any renewal option thereof." 
 On May 17, 1988, before the sublease agreement had been signed, the Patels filed 
suit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging that Sun and Lancaster had violated 
the PMPA.  The Patels claimed that the PMPA entitled them to a right of first refusal 
before the franchise location could be sold and that Sun had failed to grant them this 
right or to offer to sell the property to them.0  Accordingly, the Patels asserted that 
they were entitled to injunctive relief and money damages under the PMPA.  On May 20, 
1988, the Patels signed the sublease with Sun.0   
 In October 1988, the district court denied the Patels' motion for a preliminary 
injunction, holding that the statutory precondition for injunctive relief, nonrenewal of 
the franchise, had not yet occurred.  Patel v. Sun Ref. & Mktg. Co., No. 88
at 1-2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 14, 1988) ("Patel I").  On motion for reconsideration, the court 
affirmed its holding but invited the Patels to recast their complaint as one for 
                     
0Lancaster is neither a refiner nor a distributor of motor fuels.  Additionally, Lancaster 
is not a subsidiary of, nor does it have any other relationship with, Sun beyond the 
purchase of the real estate here in question. 
0The parties dispute whether Sun offered to sell the service station premises to the 
Patels before selling to Lancaster.  The district court did note during the 1988 
proceedings that:  "The franchisor has sold the premises without first offering plaintiff
franchisees a chance to purchase."  Patel v. Sun Ref. & Mktg, 710 F. Supp. 1023 (E.D. Pa. 
1989) ("Patel II"). 
0The Patels assert that they signed this renewal, with its notice of the lease expiration, 
because they had no choice. Supplemental Appendix at 132.  
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declaratory judgment.  Patel v. Sun Ref. & Mktg. Co., 710 F. Supp. 1023, 1024 (E.D. Pa. 
1989) ("Patel II").  
  Although the Patels amended their complaint, the district court again denied 
their request for relief under the PMPA on the ground that the triggering act required 
under the statute, nonrenewal of the franchise, had not yet occurred. Patel v. Sun Ref. & 
Mktg. Co., 1992 WL 25737, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 1992) ("Patel III").  The Patels did not appeal 
this order. 
 Meanwhile, in December 1991, the Patels and Sun executed another sublease 
extending the term to August 20, 1994. This new sublease, like its predecessor, explicitly 
stated that Sun's right to grant possession of the premises was subject to its underlying 
lease with Lancaster, which would expire on September 30, 1994. 
 On April 28, 1994, 120 days before the expiration of the sublease, Sun notified 
the Patels that their franchise and sublease would not be renewed due to the expiration of 
Sun's underlying lease with Lancaster.  The underlying lease between Sun and Lancaster 
expired on September 30, 1994.   
 After receiving notice from Sun that their franchise would not be renewed,
Patels in July 1994 commenced the instant action in district court, again alleging that 
the nonrenewal of their franchise was improper under the PMPA because Sun had not offered 
the Patels a right of first refusal before the sale to Lancaster, nor had it offered to 
sell the property to the Patels.  In deciding the Patels' motion for a preliminary 
injunction, the district court found that, because Sun's sale of the premises to Lancaster 
did not constitute a termination or nonrenewal of the franchise, the Patels' rights under 
the PMPA were not triggered at that time.  Patel v. Sun Co., 866 F. Supp. 871, 873 (E.D. 
Pa. 1994) ("Patel IV").  The court further held that Sun's loss of the right to grant 
possession of the premises due to the expiration of its underlying lease with Lancaster 
was a valid reason for nonrenewal under the PMPA and that, therefore, no serious question 
existed regarding the merits of the Patels' PMPA claim.  Id. at 873-74.  Accordingly, the 
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Patels' motion for a preliminary injunction was denied.  The Patels appealed, and we 
granted a stay pending appeal. 
II. 
   The PMPA regulates the relationship between motor fuel distributors, 
principally oil refiners, and their franchisees, principally retail gas station operators.  
Prior to the passage of the PMPA, evidence suggested that "distributors had been using the 
threat of termination or nonrenewal to compel franchisees to comply with the distributor's 
marketing policies . . . [and] to gain an unfair advantage in contract disputes." 
v. Amoco Oil Co., 830 F.2d 476, 478 (3d Cir. 1987) (in banc) (citing S. Rep. No. 731, 95th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 17-19, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 873, 875-77) ("Senate Report").   Accordingly, in 
passing the PMPA, Congress sought to "protect a franchisee's 'reasonable expe
continuing the franchise relationship while at the same time insuring that distributors 
have 'adequate flexibility . . . to respond to changing market conditions and consumer 
preferences.'"  Id. (quoting Senate Report at 19, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 877).
 In order to effectuate these purposes, the PMPA prohibits distributors from 
terminating or nonrenewing franchises, unless the termination or nonrenewal is based upon 
one of the enumerated grounds set forth in the statute.  15 U.S.C. § 2802.  Most 
enumerated exceptions involve franchisee misconduct, which is not alleged in this case.  
See, e.g., § 2802(b)(2)(C) (termination based upon franchisee's failure to pay sums due 
under the franchise agreement); §2802(b)(3)(B) (nonrenewal based upon "bona fide customer 
complaints" about franchisee's operations); § 2802(b)(3)(C) (nonrenewal based upon 
franchisee's failure to operate property "in a clean, safe, and healthful manner").  
 In addition to the exceptions for franchisee misconduct, the PMPA al
authorizes nonrenewal for a limited set of business reasons, two of which are involved in 
the instant appeal.  First, a distributor may fail to renew a franchise agreement if the 
distributor decides to sell the premises "in good faith and in the normal course of 
business."  §2802(b)(D)(i)(III).  In such a case, however, the distributor must either 
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have offered to sell the premises to the franchisee, § 2802(b)(D)(iii)(I), or have offered 
the franchisee a right of first refusal of the purchaser's offer, § 2802(b)(D)(iii)(II). 
Second, a distributor may fail to renew a franchise agreement upon the "occurrence of an 
event which is relevant to the franchise relationship and as a result of which . . . 
nonrenewal of the franchise is reasonable."  § 2802(b)(2)(C).  One "relevant event" 
recognized in the statute is the franchisor's loss of its "right to grant possession of 
the leased marketing premises through expiration of an underlying lease."  § 2802(c)(4).
 Section 2805(a) of the statute creates a civil cause of action for franchisees 
against franchisors for violations of the statute.  In these civil actions, courts are 
free to exercise "such equitable relief . . . necessary to remedy the effects" of the PMPA 
violation.  § 2805(b)(1).  This equitable relief includes, but is not limited to, 
preliminary injunctions.  Id. Section 2805(d) also provides for an award of actual and 
exemplary damages and of attorney and expert witness fees to a franchisee who prevails in 
a civil action against a franchisor. Section 2805(e) then provides an exception to an 
award of injunctive relief in that the court may not compel a continuation or renewal of a 
franchise if the franchisor has demonstrated to the court that the nonrenewal of the 
franchise was caused by the decision of the franchisor, made in good faith and in the 
normal course of business, to convert, alter, or sell the premises or to withdraw from 
marketing fuel oil in that geographic market area. 
III. 
   We review the district court's conclusions of law in a plenary fashi
findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard, and its decision to grant or deny an 
                     
0In 1994, Congress amended the "loss of underlying lease" exception by requiring a 
franchisor to offer to assign to the franchisee "any option to extend the underlying lease 
or option to purchase the marketing premises that is held by the franchisor." Pub. L. No. 
103-371, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., 108 Stat. 3484-85.  That amendment is not applicable to the 
present case. 
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injunction for abuse of discretion.  Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharmaceuticals Co. v. 
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharmaceuticals, 19 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 1994). 
A. 
 We begin our analysis of the instant appeal with plaintiffs' request for an 
injunction against Lancaster.  Plaintiffs' cause of action against both defendants arises out 
of § 2805(a) of the PMPA which reads, in relevant part: 
  
If a franchisor fails to comply with the requirements of section 2802 or 2803 of 
this title, the franchisee may maintain a civil action against such franchisor
§ 2805(a) (emphasis added).  In the PMPA, "franchisor" is defined as: 
a refiner or distributor . . . who authorizes or permits, under a franchise, a 
retailer or distributor to use a trademark in connection with the sale, 
consignment, or distribution of motor fuel. 
§ 2801(3).  Thus, the application of the PMPA is limited to causes of action arising 
between franchisees and franchisors engaged in the petroleum marketing field.  It is clear 
from the facts presented in this case, however, that Lancaster is not a refiner or 
distributor of motor fuel, and therefore falls outside the literal scope of the statute.   
For this reason, the Patels cannot obtain relief against Lancaster under the PMPA.
 Plaintiffs maintain, however, that Lancaster, as the purchaser of the property, 
should be "charged with notice of Sun's obligations under [the] PMPA" and should hold 
"title subject to those obligations."  Complaint, ¶24.  We find this argument 
unpersuasive.  Plaintiffs fail to indicate any evidence, either in the text of the PMPA or 
in its legislative history, that the PMPA was meant to apply beyond the franchisee
franchisor relationship.  Cf. Barnes v. Gulf Oil Corp. 824 F.2d 300, 303-04 (4th Cir. 
1987) (permitting individuals or small companies to qualify as "franchisors" would permit 
large refiners and distributors to terminate their relationship with a franchisee by 
assigning the remainder of the franchise term to small enterprises with limited 
resources).  Moreover, it would seem beyond any legal or practical ability of Lancaster to 
license the Patels to use the Sun trademarks or to provide the Patels with petroleum 
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products for retail sale.  Therefore, because the language of the statute is unambiguous, 
we find no reason to apply the PMPA to Lancaster.0  
B. 
 Our analysis turns next to the Patels' request for an injunction against Sun.  
The criteria that courts are to consider in determining whether to grant a preliminary 
injunction under the PMPA are set out in § 2805(b)(2) of the act, which reads in relevant 
part: 
 
[T]he court shall grant a preliminary injunction if-- 
  
(A) the franchisee shows-- 
 
  (i) the franchise of which he is a party has been terminated or the franchise 
relationship of which he is a party has not been renewed, and 
 
  (ii) there exist sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make 
such questions a fair ground for litigation; and 
 
(B) the court determines that, on balance, the hardships imposed upon the 
franchisor by the issuance of such preliminary injunctive relief will be less 
than the hardship which would be imposed upon such franchisee if such 
preliminary injunctive relief were not granted. 
§ 2805(b)(2).    
 In denying the Patels' motion for a preliminary injunction, the district court 
determined that no sufficiently serious questions regarding the merits existed to warrant 
a balancing of the hardships.  In reaching this conclusion, the district court r
part on the judgment that "[w]hen Sun sold the station to Lancaster it did not terminate 
or fail to renew the Patels' franchise relationship."  Patel IV, 866 F. Supp. at 873.
                     
0The dissent argues in Part V that Lancaster took title to the real property, knowing of 
Sun's obligations as a franchisor under the PMPA and thereby is subject to the same 
responsibilities with respect to the property as was Sun.  For the reasons stated by the 
court in Barnes, however, we cannot agree that a petroleum refiner/distributor should be 
able to pass on all or part of its obligations under the PMPA to a third party who does 
not qualify as a franchisor under the PMPA. 
0This conclusion echoes the conclusion reached earlier in Patel I, Patel II, and 
III.  In those cases, the determination that the sale of the property did not constitute a 
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 Our determination to deny the Patels' motion for a preliminary inju
against Sun is not, however, based upon this conclusion.  It is based on § 2805(e) which 
bars an injunction that would require a franchisor to continue a franchise in a location 
which the franchisor, in good faith and in the normal course of business, has decided to 
sell.0  In other words, if a franchisor does not want to take over a franchise itself or 
to transfer it to another dealer, but simply for business reasons wants to close down its 
retail operations in a certain location, the PMPA will not enjoin a franchisor from doing 
so provided the decision is made in good faith and in accordance with the requirements of 
§ 2804.   
 If the franchisor does attempt to close down the franchise location without 
meeting the requirements of § 2802, however, it may be liable in damages to the 
franchisee.  Although § 2805(e) does not permit a permanent injunction maintaining the 
franchise under these circumstances, it does provide for the franchisee to recover actual 
damages and reasonable attorney and expert witness fees if, for instance, the franchisor 
has failed to offer to sell the premises to the franchisee prior to a sale to a third 
party. 
 Because the record here demonstrates that Sun did not take over the franchise in 
order to operate it for its own account or to lease it to a new tenant, see
2802(b)(2)(E), we conclude that the district court could not enter a permanent injunction 
requiring Sun to continue the Patel's franchise at its present location.  In view of the 
                                                                  
termination or nonrenewal of the Patels' franchise led the court to find that the Patels' 
rights under the PMPA had not yet been triggered.   
 Unlike the court in these earlier decisions, we are not confident that Sun's 
sale of the station to Lancaster did not constitute an action sufficient to trigger the 
Patels' rights under the statute.  It is important to note, however, that the Patels could 
have appealed the decisions in Patel II and Patel III, but chose not to.  Accordingly, 
this Court must decide the instant appeal in light of the parties' current positions.     
0The dissent, citing the legislative history, argues that §2805(e) applies only to 
permanent, not to preliminary, injunctions. The language of the statute does not, however, 
make that distinction.  
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provisions of § 2805(e), we find that the denial of the injunction by the district court 
was not erroneous. 
 Clearly, one cannot help but feel some sympathy for the Patels.  At the time of 
their initial attempt to obtain injunctive relief, they were sent away and told to seek 
such relief when their franchise was not renewed.  Now, having returned to court after the 
occurrence of the nonrenewal, they are told that they are not eligible for injunctive 
relief.  The Patels still have, however, the opportunity to present to the district court 
their contention that the nonrenewal of their franchise violates § 2802 because the reason 
given for nonrenewal, the expiration of the underlying lease, was a condition created by 
the franchisor when it sold the property without offering the franchisee an opport
purchase it. Even if injunctive relief is no longer available to the Patels, the PMPA does 
provide for awards of damages and fees to a franchisee who is successful in a civil action 
against a franchisor.  15 U.S.C. § 2805(d) and (e).0       
 Additionally, we note that the language of the statute may have complicated the 
Patel's situation.  If there is a gap in the provisions of the PMPA, it should be 
corrected by Congress if Congress decides that this gap could undermine its intent in 
passing the PMPA.  This decision, however, belongs with Congress and not with the courts.
 IV. 
 In conclusion, we will affirm the district court's denial of the Patels' request 
for a preliminary injunction against Sun and Lancaster.  The Patels, however, still have 
                     
0
 The dissent states that "[t]he majority holds that the franchisor's obligation 
to offer to sell to the franchisee can be avoided simply by postponing the nonrenewal or 
termination of the franchise to a time subsequent to the title closing."  Dissent op. at 
1; see also id. at 13 ("The majority opinion, however, holding that a sale-
followed by expiration of an underlying lease makes nonrenewal reasonable, allows 
franchisors to completely dispense with the bona fide offer requirement.").  We do not 
hold.  Instead, we hold that a franchisor that fails to offer the property to its 
franchisee before selling to another is liable to the franchisee for damages, but may not 
be enjoined from the sale, provided the transaction is made in good faith and in 
normal course of business, with the requisite notice.   
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the opportunity to seek damages under the PMPA.  Accordingly, we will remand this matter 
to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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Patel v. Sun, No. 94-2092 
  
SAROKIN, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 I respectfully dissent because I believe that the majority opinion permits 
franchisors to circumvent one of the most fundamental protections afforded by Congress to 
franchisees under the PMPA -- namely the right to purchase the franchise premises if the 
franchisor elects to sell.  The majority holds that the franchisor's obligation to offer 
to sell to the franchisee can be avoided simply by postponing the nonrenewal or 
termination of the franchise to a time subsequent to the title closing.   
  While the statute does permit the franchisor to sell its premises for valid 
economic reasons, it grants an important corollary right to the franchisee to protect its 
investment in the premises by affording it an opportunity to purchase the premises if the 
sale will result in the termination or nonrenewal of the franchise.  At a minimum, the 
unique circumstances presented here establish fair grounds for litigation and thus warrant 
the issuance of a preliminary injunction.  Accordingly, I would reverse the denial and 
remand for entry of injunctive relief. 
 
I. 
 In addition to the facts set forth in the majority opinion, the following are 
significant. 
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 At the time that Lancaster purchased the parcel of land from Sun in December 
1987, plaintiffs allege that pursuant to the purchase and sale agreement, Sun indemnified 
Lancaster for any PMPA claims arising out of the transaction.  Although plaintiffs have 
not supplied the court with this agreement, the parties acknowledged the existence of an 
indemnification clause at oral argument before the district court.  Supplemental Appendix 
("S.A.") at 16, 148-50.  
 After purchase, Lancaster leased the franchise location back to Sun for six 
years, through September 30, 1994, and granted Sun the right to sublease the property.  
According to the testimony of its general partner, it was Lancaster's expectation at the 
time of purchase that upon the expiration of the lease-back in 1994, Sun would remove the 
underground fuel tanks, clean the soil, and "put the property back into its existing 
condition without any oil tanks or environmental problems."  S.A. at 151. Thus, as of 
December 1987 plaintiffs' ability to continue in business at the franchise location was 
due to expire no later than September 1994. 
 After completing the sale and taking the lease-back from Lancaster, Sun offered 
a three-year sublease to plaintiffs. Recognizing that Sun's sale to Lancaster represented 
a threat to the continuation of their franchise, plaintiffs immediately brought suit in 
district court in May 1988, alleging that Sun and Lancaster had violated the PMPA.  Only 
after filing suit did plaintiffs sign the sublease.    
 An "Amendment and Ratification" to the sublease stated: 
UNDERLYING LEASE 
Company's right to grant possession of the Premises to Dealer is subject to an 
underlying lease which contains an initial term of Six years; Nine Months and 
Seven Days (6Years, 9Months & 7Days) years, [sic] from 12/23/87 to 
NO RENEWALS which lease might expire or nonrenew at the expiration of the 
initial term or any renewal option thereof. 
S.A. at 220.  It was thus evident to the Patels that any opportunity they had to sub
the premises from Sun and thereby continue their franchise operation would be permanently 
lost upon termination of Lancaster's lease to Sun.  When asked at a hearing in the instant 
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litigation whether he executed the 1988 sublease, Mr. Patel replied, "Yes, I had no 
choice."  S.A. at 132. 
 After the district court rejected the plaintiff's request for an injunction in 
Patel I and then again on motion for reconsideration in Patel II, plaintiffs amended their 
complaint to seek a declaratory judgment at the invitation of the court. The court 
repeated its conviction that "the PMPA does give to the franchisee the right of first 
refusal in the event of the franchisor's non-renewal," but dismissed the complaint because 
nonrenewal had not yet occurred.  Patel v. Sun Refining and Marketing Co., 1992 WL 25737 
at *1 (E.D.Pa. 1992)("Patel III"). The district court made clear that "[i]f such an event 
occurs, plaintiffs will have the protection of the PMPA at their disposal."  
Plaintiffs did not appeal. 
 Nonrenewal, identified by the district court in 1988, 1989, and 1992 as the 
qua non of a PMPA claim for relief, has now occurred.  In Spring 1994, Sun notified 
plaintiffs that their franchise and sublease would not be renewed because of the 
expiration of Sun's lease-back with Lancaster.  Plaintiffs promptly commenced this action, 
arguing that their PMPA claims were now ripe and, as they have maintained since 1988, that 
the 1987 sale between Sun and Lancaster could not extinguish or reduce their rights under 
the Act.   
 The district court denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, 
relying on the earlier ruling that Sun's sale of the premises did not "trigger" 
plaintiffs' rights under the Act, but ignoring the corollary that upon nonrenewal, those 
rights would attach.  Patel v. Sun Co., 866 F.Supp. 871, 872 (E.D.Pa. 1994)("
 Thus, when plaintiffs first sought injunctive relief, it was denied on the 
grounds that notwithstanding the sale, their franchise remained in effect.  They were 
assured, however, that if and when the franchise was adversely affected, then their rights 
would be protected.  But injunctive relief was likewise denied when nonrenewal 
occurred, on the grounds that it was not the sale but rather the expiration of the lease
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back which resulted in the nonrenewal.  In essence, the district court told the Patels in 
1988 that their claims were too early and in 1994 that their claims were too late!  
 
II.   
 The PMPA regulates the relationship between motor fuel distributors and their 
franchisees.  A principal reason for Congress' passage of the PMPA was to protect 
franchisees from having their businesses subject to termination at the hands of 
unscrupulous franchisors.  As noted by the majority, evidence at Congressional hearings on 
the PMPA "indicated that distributors had been using the threat of termination or 
nonrenewal to compel franchisees to comply with the distributor's marketing policies . . . 
[and] to gain an unfair advantage in contract disputes." Slatky v. Amoco Oil Co.
476, 478 (3d Cir. 1987)(in banc)(citing S.Rep. No. 731, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 17
U.S.C.C.A.N. 873, 875-77) ("Senate Report").  In response to such evidence, Congress 
passed the PMPA to prevent large petroleum companies from exploiting franchisees. 
O'Shea v. Amoco Oil Co., 886 F.2d 584, 587-88 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Sun Refining & 
Marketing Co. v. Rago, 741 F.2d 670, 673 (3d Cir. 1984)("major thrust" of PMPA is "to 
protect franchisees from arbitrary or unfair termination"); Barnes v. Gulf Oil Corp.
F.2d 300, 304-05 (4th Cir. 1987)(PMPA's "principal concern" is "protection of 
franchisees"); Khorenian v. Union Oil Co., 761 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1985)(PMPA must be 
construed liberally to achieve legislative goal of protecting franchisees); 
Mobil Oil Corp., 864 F.2d 981, 982 (2d Cir. 1989)(PMPA directed at "the David versus 
Goliath aspect of the relationship between the small retailer franchisee and the giant 
petroleum company franchisor"). 
 The statute achieves this purpose by enacting the general rule that no 
distributor may terminate or fail to renew a franchise, except for enumerated reasons and 
upon adequate notice. §2802(a).  Most exceptions involve franchisee misconduct, which is 
not an issue in this case.  See §2802(b)(2)(A)&(B), (b)(3)(B)&(C).  To enforce the general 
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rule against termination or nonrenewal, the Act establishes a private right of action for 
a franchisee whose franchise has been terminated or not renewed. This court has described 
the Act as creating "a presumption that any termination of a franchise is unlawful."  
Rago, 741 F.2d at 672.  
  As stated by the majority, nonrenewal of a lease by a franchisor is p
by the PMPA for a limited number of business decisions, two of which are at issue here.  
First, a distributor may fail to renew the franchise agreement of a franchisee who leases 
property from the distributor if "in good faith and in the normal course of business" the 
distributor decides to sell the premises, provided the distributor first offers the 
property for sale to the franchisee.  §2802(b)(3)(D).  
 Second, the PMPA permits a distributor to nonrenew the agreement upon 
"occurrence of an event which is relevant to the franchise relationship and as a result of 
which . . . nonrenewal of the franchise is reasonable."  §2802(b)(2)(C).  One "relevant 
event" which, by the statute's own definition renders nonrenewal reasonable, is the loss 
of the franchisor's "right to grant possession of the leased marketing premises through 
expiration of an underlying lease."  §2802(c)(4).0 
 
III. 
 I begin my analysis with the Patels' request for an injunction against Sun.  The 
enforcement provisions of the PMPA grant the district court broad powers to remedy the 
effects of a franchisor's failure to comply with the Act, including the authority to enter 
interim equitable relief.  §2805(b)(1).  Under the relaxed standard for a preliminary 
injunction, an aggrieved franchisee must show (1) a franchise has been terminated or not 
renewed; (2) there are sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make such 
                     
0In 1994 Congress amended the "loss of underlying lease" exception by requiring a 
franchisor to offer to assign to the franchisee "any option to extend the underlying lease 
or option to purchase the marketing premises that is held by the franchisor." Pub.L. 103
371, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 108 Stat. 3484-85. 
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questions a fair ground for litigation; and (3) the balance of hardships tips in favor of 
the franchisee. §2805(b)(2).  The second prong establishes a lower standard than the 
traditional requirement that a moving party demonstrate a substantial likelihood of 
success on the merits.  Rago, 741 F.2d at 672.  In this case, the district court 
determined that plaintiffs could not satisfy the second prong and denied relief. 
866 F.Supp. at 873. 
 A.  Termination or nonrenewal of the franchise 
 Plaintiffs and Sun are indisputably franchisees and franchisor respectively, as 
defined by the PMPA.  §§2801(2),(3). Unlike in the previous case, the franchise has been 
non-renewed, and the first prong is satisfied. 
   B.  Sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make such 
questions a fair ground for litigation 
 Sun maintains that it did not violate the general prohibition on nonrenewal 
because (1) the 1987 sale of the premises to Lancaster did not terminate or nonrenew the 
franchise, and thus its duty to offer plaintiffs the premises under §2802(b)(3)(D) did not 
arise; and (2) the expiration of its underlying lease with Lancaster in 1994 is a 
"relevant event" under §2802(c)(4), necessarily making nonrenewal reasonable under 
§2802(b)(C).  The district court agreed. 
 The question before us is whether the exception to the prohibition on nonrenewal 
invoked by defendants creates fair grounds for litigation, because of the sequence of 
these events. 
 1. The "sale" exception 
 A franchisor may nonrenew a franchise based on its sale of the franchise 
location, provided the franchisor first makes a bona fide offer to sell to the 
§2802(b)(3)(D).  See Slatky, supra.  The parties dispute whether Sun offered plaintiffs 
the premises before selling them to Lancaster.   
 However, in the previous action, the district court commented that Sun "has sold 
the premises, without first offering plaintiff-franchisees a chance to purchase."  
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II, 710 F.Supp. at 1023.  See also Patel III, 1992 WL 25737 at *1 ("Sun . . . sold the 
premises to defendant Lancaster Associates without first offering to plaintiffs an 
opportunity to purchase the land").  Here, the district court stated that the Patels had 
sued "based on the prior failure of Sun to offer the property to them for sale or to offer 
them a right of first refusal when Sun sold the property to Lancaster in 1987,"  
866 F.Supp. at 873, but ultimately it made no explicit finding as to whether Sun had made 
a bona fide offer to plaintiffs before selling to Lancaster. 
 If Sun did make a bona fide offer, then defendants should be entitled to rely on 
the "sale exception" to the general prohibition on nonrenewal, provided the other elements 
of that exception are also met; if Sun made no offer, then defendants may not justify the 
1994 nonrenewal on this basis. 
 2. The "relevant event" exception 
 A franchisor may end a franchise if an event relevant to the franchise 
relationship occurs which makes termination or nonrenewal "reasonable."  §2802(b)(2)(C).  
This exception (which I will refer to as the "relevant event" exception) does not depend 
on the franchisor providing the franchisee a right of first refusal.  A different section 
of the Act provides that one relevant event which makes nonrenewal reasonable is "loss of 
the franchisor's right to grant possession" of the franchise location.  §2802(c)(4).  Sun 
maintains that the 1994 nonrenewal comported with the "relevant event" exception, because 
pursuant to §2802(c)(4) the expiration of its lease-back necessarily made nonrenewal 
"reasonable." 
 First, I reject Sun's argument that §2802(c)(4) establishes a per
Congress itself has explained that the loss of the right to grant possession does not 
always satisfy the reasonableness requirement of the relevant event exception: 
it is not intended that termination or non-renewal should be permitted based 
upon the expiration of a lease which does not evidence the existence of an arms 
length relationship between the parties and as a result of the expiration of 
which no substantive change in control of the premises results. 
Senate Report at 38, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 896.  Thus, there can be no per se
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 Second, the circumstances described in the Senate Report do not exhaust those in 
which expiration of an underlying lease fails to satisfy the "relevant event" exception.  
Rather, the legislative history indicates that a court must give at least minimal scrutiny 
to the asserted "relevant event," even if that event is arguably enumerated at §2802(c).  
Thus, although plaintiffs have supplied no evidence that the transaction between Sun and 
Lancaster was anything but at arms length, this does not end our inquiry, even assuming 
good faith. 
 Here, we are faced with a series of "relevant events" in which (1) the 
franchisee entered the franchise relationship when the franchisor held title to the 
franchise location; (2) the franchisor sold the property to a party that does not refine 
or distribute motor oil; and (3) the franchisor non-renewed the franchise when its lease
back expired.  For the purposes of this section, moreover, I will assume arguendo
failed to make a bona fide offer to the Patels before the 1987 sale.  Finally, I note that 
testimony by Lancaster's general partner indicated that it was Sun's intention in 1987 to 
nonrenew the franchise in 1994.  
 Under these circumstances, I conclude that plaintiffs have established that the 
question whether Sun's loss of the right to grant possession is a relevant event making 
nonrenewal reasonable presents fair grounds for litigation.  Several theories inform this 
conclusion. 
 First, the 1987 sale-without-offer was the "but for" cause of the 1
expiration of the underlying lease.  Because Lancaster is neither a refiner nor 
distributor of motor fuel, the 1987 sale eroded plaintiffs' franchise rights, jeopardized 
its business, and positioned Sun to evade the Act in a manner I believe Congress s
proscribe.  Even when nonrenewal does not occur at the moment of sale, the risk does, 
because the franchisee's rights are immediately diminished. See, e.g., Wagnon v. Wilkins 
Distributing, No. C85-829R, slip. op., May 21, 1986 (W.D.Wash. May 22, 1986) (franchisor's 
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sale of premises to party not bound by PMPA, without offering property to franchisee, 
diminished franchisee's "inchoate rights").  
 Second, one must distinguish between franchise relationships in which the 
franchisor holds an underlying lease at the outset of the relationship and those in which 
the franchisor's fee interest is unilaterally reduced to a leasehold after the 
commencement of the franchise.  In the first instance, the franchisee enters the 
relationship with knowledge that it is subject to nonrenewal or termination upon 
expiration of the underlying lease, or any other event provided for therein.  The 
franchisee can accept or reject the relationship fully cognizant at the outset of the 
risks involved.  Here, however, when the Patels chose to commence their relationship with 
Sun in 1978, Sun's control of the franchise location was not subject to an underlying 
lease which could limit the duration of the franchise. 
 Third, the testimony that as of December 1987 Sun planned to nonrene
prevent Sun from establishing that it complied with the special notice requirement of the 
"relevant event" exception.  See §2802(b)(2)(C).  All exceptions require notice 90 days 
before nonrenewal.  §§2802(b)(1), 2804.  The "relevant event" exception, however, adds the 
further requirement that the franchisor provide notice of nonrenewal "not more than
120 days after it has "acquired actual or constructive knowledge" of the relevant event.  
§2802(b)(2)(C).  If Sun had knowledge in 1987 that its lease-back would not be extended in 
1994, then its notice was seven years late. 
 Fourth, in the previous case between plaintiffs and Sun, the district court 
warned Sun that in the event of nonrenewal, plaintiffs "will have the protection of the 
PMPA at their disposal."  Patel III, 1992 WL 25737 at *2.  See also Patel II, 710 F.Supp. 
at 1024 (franchisor's sale of the franchise location "cannot justify non-renewal of the 
franchise unless the franchisor did allow the franchisee to purchase"). 
 Fifth, this conclusion comports with the legislative intent that the PMPA 
protect the reasonable expectations of franchisees from unscrupulous franchisor practices.  
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Slatky, 830 F.2d at 478-79.  The particular scheme at issue here, while not considered 
previously by our circuit, is precisely the sort of practice Congress sought to prevent.  
The 1994 PMPA amendments, which increased the protections for a franchisee when the 
franchisor seeks to sell a franchise location, confirms that abusive franchisor practices 
remain an important Congressional concern.  See Pub.L. 103-371, 108 Stat. 3484.
 Finally, a contrary holding is akin to writing into the PMPA an enormous new 
exception to the general prohibition on nonrenewal.  Such an outcome is incompatible with 
the Congressional intent that the reasonable expectations of franchisees be protected, 
while at the same time the business judgment of franchisors be respected.  
F.2d at 478. The provision that a franchisor may sell in good faith so long as the 
franchisee is offered a right of first refusal accomplishes this legislative purpose.  The 
majority opinion, however, holding that a sale-without-offer followed by expiration of an 
underlying lease makes nonrenewal reasonable, allows franchisors to completely dispense 
with the bona fide offer requirement.  The sale can take place without first offering the 
premises to the franchisee, followed by nonrenewal after the expiration of a lease
no matter how brief. 
 I conclude that when a franchisor owns a franchise location at the commencement 
of the franchise relationship but sells it to a party that does not refine or distribute 
motor fuel, without making the franchisee a bona fide offer to sell and with the intention 
of non-renewing upon expiration of the franchisor's lease-back, then upon actual 
nonrenewal there are fair grounds for litigation whether or not the "relevant event" 
exception has been satisfied.  I would leave for trial final disposition of the claim, 
including, if necessary, proof of the elements of the "relevant event" exception.
 This conclusion is not undermined by the Patels' execution of two subleases with 
Sun, each of which informed the franchisees of the imminent loss of Sun's right to grant 
possession.  First, before signing the 1988 sublease, the Patels sought to protect their 
rights by filing the first lawsuit. Second, knowing that the sale had already been 
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consummated, the Patels had absolutely no choice but to accept the terms and conditions 
proposed by Sun.  Sun's cross-examination of Mr. Patel makes this point manifest:
 Q And, sir, isn't that correct that after the sale of this property to 
Lancaster Associates in January of 1988, you were offered and you entered into a lease for 
the premises from 1988 through 1991? 
 
 A Yes, I had no choice. 
 
S.A. at 132. 
 Nor would I treat the execution of the 1988 sublease as the commencement of a 
"new" franchise relationship, one entered by the Patels with full knowledge that Sun would 
lose the right to grant possession of the premises in September 1994.  By 1988 the
had already spent a decade developing the good will of their business.  The first 
franchise agreement with Sun, executed in 1978, commenced the franchise relationship.
 Nor finally am I persuaded by Sun's reference to cases in which a franchisor's 
loss of an underlying lease satisfied the "relevant event exception," because in each case 
the franchise relationship commenced when the franchisor held a lease, not title, to the 
franchise location.  See Hutchens v. Eli Roberts Oil Co., 838 F.2d 1138, 114
1988); Veracka v. Shell Oil Co., 655 F.2d 445, 446-47 (1st Cir. 1981); Atkins v. Chevron 
USA, Inc., 672 F.Supp. 1373, 1375 (W.D.Wash. 1987).  In these cases the franchisees were 
on notice at the outset of the possible loss of the underlying lease and could not 
reasonably expect that the franchisor's control of the property would continue 
indefinitely.  Isolated from the sale-without-offer, Sun's loss of the right to grant 
possession may make nonrenewal reasonable, but expiration of the lease-back cannot and 
should not be analyzed separately from the other relevant circumstances.  Consequently, if 
Sun made a bona fide offer to the Patels before selling to Lancaster, then it may invoke 
the "sale" exception to the general prohibition on nonrenewal.  If there was no offer, 
plaintiffs have established sufficiently serious questions whether or not Sun has 
satisfied the "relevant event" exception to make the issue fair grounds for litigation.
 C. Balance of hardships 
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 The district court did not reach this element.  If the district court were to 
find on remand, which I deem appropriate, that Sun did not make a bona fide offer before 
the 1987 sale, then the court should determine whether plaintiffs have satisfied the final 
prong of the preliminary injunction standard, although it clearly appears established 
based upon the undisputed facts. See Barnes, 824 F.2d at 306 (balance of hardships under 
PMPA invariably tips in favor of small franchisee rather than large franchisor).
 
IV.  
 Sun maintains that even if plaintiffs have met the standard for issuance of a 
preliminary injunction, §2805(e) bars a preliminary injunction when the basis for 
nonrenewal is the good faith sale of the premises.  Throughout this case, Sun has sought 
to characterize its nonrenewal as based on the expiration of the underlying lease, rather 
than the sale of the premises. If the basis for nonrenewal is indeed the expiration of the 
lease-back, then by its own terms §2805(e) does not apply. 
 Even if the basis for nonrenewal were the 1987 sale, the Patels contend that 
§2805(e) applies only to permanent injunctions.  The sole court of appeals to consider 
this question held that the structure, purpose, and legislative history of the PMPA compel 
the conclusion that §2805(e) does not apply to preliminary injunctions.  Hilo v. Exxon 
Corp., 997 F.2d 641, 647 (9th Cir. 1993).  I agree. 
 The plain language of §2805(b)(2) makes issuance of a preliminary injunction 
mandatory when the three-pronged standard is met: "the court shall grant a preliminary 
injunction if . . ." This provision is admittedly in tension with the language of 
§2805(e)(1), which provides that a court "may not compel a continuation or renewal of the 
franchise relationship" in certain circumstances.  Thus we must look beyond the text 
the statute. 
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 First, Congress's overriding purpose in enacting the PMPA was to protect a 
franchisee's reasonable expectation of continuing the franchise relationship.  
F.2d at 478; Rago, 741 F.2d at 672.    
 Second, the structure of §2805, entitled "Enforcement Provisions," suggests a 
linear, chronological development of the subsections: subsection (a) establishes a private 
cause of action; (b) provides for interim equitable relief and sets forth the standard for 
issuance of a preliminary injunction; (c) establishes the burdens of proof at trial; (d) 
provides for legal remedies, including actual and exemplary damages, fees and costs; and 
(e) provides a limitation on equitable relief.  See Hilo, 997 F.2d at 644-45.
 Third, the legislative history strongly indicates that Congress intended 
§2805(e) to apply only to permanent injunctions.  The Senate Report repeatedly 
characterized §2805(e) as limiting only permanent relief: 
An equitable defense to permanent injunctive relief is set forth in sectio
[2805(e)].  The court is barred from issuing permanent injunctive relief if [the 
elements of §2805(e) are met] . . . Such a defense to permanent injunctive 
relief does not affect the right of the franchisee to recover [damages and fees] 
. . . Under [§2805(e)], the court could not issue a permanent injunction against 
the nonrenewal . . . It should be stressed, however, that the court may issue 
permanent injunctive relief or award damages pursuant to [§2805(d)(1)] if either 
the 'good faith' or the 'normal course of business' requirement specified in 
[§2805(e)(1)(A)] is not met. 
Senate Report, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 899-900 (emphasis added). 
 Finally, I agree with the Ninth Circuit that as a matter of policy a "request 
for a preliminary injunction should not be made the occasion for a mini-trial on the issue 
of good faith."  Hilo, 997 F.2d at 646.  It makes sense to reserve for trial proof of the 
elements of the §2805(e) defense, including the basis for the nonrenewal, good faith on 
the part of the franchisor, and proper §2804 notice. 
 Thus §2805(e) does not apply to preliminary injunctions and should not bar entry 
of interim relief here.  The provision would remain available to Sun as a defense at 
trial, if the district court determined that the basis for nonrenewal is indeed the 1987 
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sale.  At that time Sun would carry the burden of establishing that the elements of 
§2805(e) are satisfied. 
 
 
V.  
 Lancaster contends that it is not a franchisor bound by the PMPA.  To meet the 
Act's definition of a "franchisor," a party must be a refiner or distributor of motor 
fuel.  §2801(3). The parties have stipulated that Lancaster is not a refiner or 
distributor of motor fuel.  S.A. at 21-22. 
 Plaintiffs maintain, however, that Lancaster, as purchaser from Sun, "is charged 
with notice of Sun's obligations under PMPA and holds title subject to those obligations." 
Complaint, ¶24.  The relevant obligation here is the PMPA's requirement that a franchise 
relationship not be terminated or non-renewed except upon one of the Act's enum
grounds. §2802(a). 
 First, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has long held that "it is the duty of a 
purchaser of real property to make inquiry respecting the rights of the party in 
possession and failing to do so they are affected with constructive notice of such facts 
as would have come to his knowledge in the proper discharge of that duty."  
Sedelsky, 80 A.2d 853, 855 (Pa. 1951).  See also Pato v. Cernuska, 493 A.2d 758, 760 
(Pa.Super. 1985).  In addition, that Lancaster bargained for an indemnification provision 
against all PMPA claims in its purchase agreement with Sun suggests that Lancaster had at 
least constructive notice of the Patels' statutory rights. 
 Second, under Pennsylvania law a purchaser takes subject to the rights of the 
party in possession: 
Any person who acquires title to real property by descent or purchase shall be 
liable to the same duties and shall have the same rights, powers and remedies in 
relation to the property as the person from whom title was acquired.
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68 Pa.C.S. §250.104.  See, e.g., De Marco v. Philadelphia, 494 A.2d 875, 876 (Pa. Commw. 
1985); Casner, American Law of Property §3.59 at 307-08 (1952) ("[a] transferee of the 
reversion who is a purchaser for value . . . takes subject to the lease if he has actual 
or constructive notice of it"). 
 These principles apply to a tenant's right of first refusal, as the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court instructed purchasers long ago: 
'[A] tenant being in possession under a lease, with an agreement in his pocket 
to become the purchaser, those circumstances altogether give him an equity, 
repelling the claim of a subsequent purchaser, who made no inquiry as to the 
nature of his possession.' Knowledge of an option to purchase is within the 
range of what such an inquiry bindingly reveals. 
Atlantic Refining Co. v. Wyoming Nat'l Bank, 51 A.2d 719, 724 (Pa. 1947) (quoting Lord 
Eldon in Taylor v. Stibbert, 2 Ves. 437).0 
 That the duties imposed on Lancaster arise under a statute  rather than a lease 
does not affect the purchaser's obligation to discharge those duties: 
An obligation that is imposed on one of the parties to a lease . . .  may be 
imposed by operation of law.  The location of the burden and benefit of that 
obligation after a transfer of an interest in the leased property depend
what is appropriate to further the purposes of imposing the obligation.
Restatement (Second) of Property §16.3(2) (1977).  Congress and this court have made clear 
the "purposes of imposing" the PMPA's obligations: protecting the reasonable expectation
of franchisees while allowing franchisors to exercise their business judgment.  
830 F.2d at 478. 
 Consequently, like any other purchaser of land in Pennsylvania, Lancaster (1) 
had a duty to inquire into the rights of the party in possession of the premises; (2) is 
charged with constructive and actual notice of those rights; and (3) took subject to those 
rights, whether those rights arose by express or implied promise or by operation of law.  
Put differently, Lancaster is in privity of estate with the Patels and took subject to 
                     
0Interestingly, in Atlantic Refining the Pennsylvania Supreme Court also held that a 
tenant who occupies a portion of a larger parcel and possesses a right of first refusal as 
to the "demised premises" may exercise his right to purchase only the demised portion.  
The tenant's right does not entitle it to purchase the entire parcel.  Atlantic Refining
51 A.2d at 722-23. 
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those obligations previously held by Sun which touch and concern the property.
suggestion that Lancaster is required to perform any functions as a franchisor of 
petroleum products.   
 This conclusion is not inconsistent with Congressional intent.  "[T]he 
legislative history of the PMPA indicates that in an extraordinary situation, a landlord 
of premises used in a franchise operation may owe certain duties to the franchisee, even 
though the landlord is not a franchisor."  Bsales v. Texaco, Inc., 516 F.Supp. 655, 661 
(D.N.J. 1981).  
  Lancaster thus has purchased the property subject to Sun's duty not to terminate 
or nonrenew the Patels' franchise, except upon various enumerated grounds.  §2802(a).  By 
failing to extend the lease-back with Sun or offering a lease or sale directly to the 
Patels, however, Lancaster has caused the nonrenewal of the franchise.  Lancaster could 
not invoke the "relevant event" exception raised by Sun, as Lancaster retains the right to 
grant possession to the premises.  Nor could Lancaster rely on the "sale" exception unless 
it can demonstrate that Sun made a bona fide offer to the Patels or Lancaster itself made 
a bona fide offer, then or now. 
 Such a resolution of plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction would comport 
with the Pennsylvania law of property as well as the PMPA's broad goals.  During the 
pendency of the litigation, Sun's sale of the property would be undisturbed; the Patels 
would continue in business at the franchise location or purchase the property outright; 
and ultimately, Lancaster would either retain or receive fair market value for the 
property.   
 This holding would not prevent Lancaster from raising any statutory or equitable 
defense at trial.  Lancaster would also be free to argue that it changed position to its 
                     
0Even if Lancaster was not directly subject to the PMPA, it would nonetheless be subject 
to the court's inherent equitable powers.  I would deem it appropriate to exercise this 
court's equitable jurisdiction over Lancaster under the extraordinary circumstances 
herein. 
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detriment if it reasonably relied on the rulings in the previous action. As previously 
noted, however, Lancaster purchased ten months before the first ruling in the previous 
action, and if it made any changes or improvements to the property, it did so in the face 
of the warnings in Patel II and III that upon nonrenewal the Patels could vindicate their 
PMPA rights. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 The PMPA permits a franchisor who owns a franchise location to sell it for valid 
business reasons; the Act also protects the franchisee by affording it a corollary right 
of first refusal, if the franchisor seeks to nonrenew the franchise based on the sale.  
Thus the franchisor may sell, but the franchisee may continue at the location 
notwithstanding the sale if the franchisee elects to purchase.  If the franchisee does not 
purchase, its franchise is subject to termination or non-renewal. 
 The franchisor is also permitted to end a franchise relationship when a relevant 
event makes nonrenewal reasonable. Yet Congress intended that a franchisee's reasonable 
expectations be protected, and we must interpret the PMPA in light of this legislative 
purpose.  Hence, when a franchisor holds title to the franchise location at the 
commencement of the franchise relationship, sells the premises to a party who is not a 
refiner or distributor of motor fuel without offering it to the franchisee with the 
intention of later non-renewing the franchise, then there are fair grounds for litigation 
whether or not such events satisfy the "reasonableness" standard of the relevant event 
exception. 
 As the district court concluded in the previous litigation, however, the 
language of the Act does indicate that a franchisee may not be able to vindicate its 
rights until actual termination or nonrenewal has occurred.  See §§2805(b)(2), 2805(c).  
Thus, even if a franchisee learns the franchisor is attempting to sell or has sold the 
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franchise location without offering it to the franchisee, the franchisee may not be 
entitled to judicial relief until actual termination or nonrenewal takes place.  But the 
time for such relief has now arrived. 
 As a purchaser Lancaster is subject to the same obligations in respect to the 
property only as the seller Sun. Lancaster was under a duty of inquiry, is charged with 
constructive and actual notice of the rights of the parties in possession, and took 
subject to the contractual and statutory rights of those parties.  The majority's holding, 
however, allows a franchisor to extinguish a franchisee's rights by selling first and non
renewing later.  This outcome protects the franchisor's right to sell, but defeats the 
franchisee's right to continue in business at the franchise location. 
 A franchisor should not be able to avoid the prohibition on nonrenewal simply by 
establishing a sale in good faith and postponing the termination or non-renewal to some 
date beyond the closing.  A purchaser who participates in such a transaction takes subject 
to the rights of the franchisee.  The PMPA was designed to protect franchisees who have 
invested time and money in developing a business at a specific location.  A franchisor 
should not be permitted to circumvent the statute and its policies by voluntarily and 
unilaterally altering the franchise relationship and subjecting the franchise to an 
earlier termination or nonrenewal on grounds for which the franchisor did not bargain and 
the franchisee did not anticipate, and which deprive the franchisee of the very protection 
which the statute was intended to provide. 
 For the foregoing reasons I would reverse the order of the district court and 
remand with the direction that if the district court were to find that neither Sun nor 
Lancaster made a bona fide offer to the Patels and the balance of hardships tips in favor 
of plaintiffs, then a preliminary injunction be entered consistent with this opinion, upon 
such terms and conditions as the district court would deem appropriate.  However, in the 
event of such findings, such order should preliminarily enjoin defendants fro
terminating or non-renewing plaintiffs' lease and franchise on the grounds that the 
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underlying lease between Sun and Lancaster expired in 1994; or (2) terminating or non
renewing plaintiffs' lease and franchise on the grounds that the property was so
1987. 
